Marginal analysis of income mobility effects by income source with an application to the agricultural policy mix by Allanson, Paul
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Marginal analysis of income mobility effects by income source with an application to
the agricultural policy mix
Allanson, Paul
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural Economics
DOI:
10.1111/1477-9552.12274
Publication date:
2019
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Allanson, P. (2019). Marginal analysis of income mobility effects by income source with an application to the
agricultural policy mix. Journal of Agricultural Economics, 70(1), 259-266. https://doi.org/10.1111/1477-
9552.12274
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 23. Jun. 2020
Marginal analysis of income mobility effects by income source with an application to the 
agricultural policy mix 
Paul Allanson1 
© 2018. This is the accepted version of the following Journal of Agricultural Economics 
article: “Marginal analysis of income mobility effects by income source with an application 
to the agricultural policy mix”, which has been published in final form at 
DOI:10.1111/1477-9552.12274. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in 
accordance with the Wiley Self-Archiving Policy [ https://authorservices.wiley.com/author-
resources/Journal-Authors/licensing-open-access/open-access/self-archiving.html ]. 
 
Abstract 
The note makes novel use of a decomposition of the Shorrocks mobility index by income source 
to identify the impact on farm income mobility of a marginal change in each component of 
income. An empirical application shows that a revenue-neutral change in the balance of 
agricultural protection between market-based support and direct payments would not have 
reduced the variability of relative farm incomes in Scottish agriculture.  
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1. Introduction 
Income fluctuations are significantly larger at the farm than the sector level, leading to 
considerable movement of farms within the income distribution (Meuwissen et al., 2008). One 
consequence of this income mobility is that longer-term inequality is less severe than would be 
inferred from cross-sectional estimates based on annual data. For example, Allanson et al. 
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(2017) reports a 5.7% fall in the Gini coefficient for Scotland if income values are calculated 
as two-year individual farm averages rather than a single year, with this fall increasing to 12% 
as the length of the measurement period is extended to include more years. A further corollary 
is that risk management schemes that spread individual losses over the general farm population 
should reduce inequality in the short-term relative to the longer-term by reducing idiosyncratic 
income volatility. Finger and El Benni (2014) identify this inequality reducing property as an 
additional benefit of the Income Stabilisation Tool introduced in the 2013 Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform (European Commission, 2013). 
This note investigates the broader conjecture that the historical shift from market-based 
support towards direct payments in the CAP will have had a similar beneficial effect by 
insulating farmers from both price and production risk (European Commission, 2008). 
Tangermann (2011) argues that the shift reduced overall income variability by providing 
farmers with regular, fixed payments. However, it does not necessarily follow that farm 
movements within the income distribution also declined as result. Using the example of 
Scottish agriculture, the note provides the first estimates, to our knowledge, of the possible 
impact of this change in the agricultural policy mix on farm income mobility. For this purpose, 
we decompose the Shorrocks (1978) mobility index by income components to identify the 
impact of a marginal change in each component on relative short-term inequality.  
 
2. Methods 
Let ty  denote annual income in year t, with mean ty , cumulative density function (cdf) 
  ( )t t tR F y P y y    and Gini coefficient  ( , ) 2cov ,t t t t tG y R y R y . The corresponding 
Shorrocks index measures the degree of equalisation if the measurement period is extended to 
T  years: 
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where ( , )A AG y R  is the Gini coefficient of average annual income over the T-year period 
A tt
y y T , with mean Ay  and relative ranks AR ; and the weights t t Aw y T y  sum to one 
by construction. TM  will be close to zero if there is little income mobility and to one if annual 
inequality is largely due to transitory idiosyncratic income shocks such that ( , )A AG y R  is close 
to zero.  
 Further defining income as the sum of a set of components 1, ,( )ktx k K  , which will 
be positive for revenues and negative for costs, then some manipulation yields:  
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where the first equality holds as ( , ) ( , ) 2 ( )( )A A t t t it A it iA At i tG y R wG y R y y R R NT y      
from results in Jones and López Nicolás (2004); ity , kitx , itR  and iAR  denote observations on 
farm 1, ,( )i Ni   ; and kAx  is the T-year average annual mean of kx . Hence TM  is equal to a 
weighted sum of component-related income mobility indices 
 1 ( , ) ( , )kT kA A kt kt ttM CI x R w CI x R   , where ( , )kt tCI x R  and ( , )kA ACI x R  are the 
concentration indices of component k over the year t and T-year income distributions 
respectively, and kt kt kAw x T x .  
 0kTM   if there is no linear association between the component and income mobility 
since the numerator ( )( )kit kA it iAi t x x R R   in (2) will equal zero in this case.
2 But, unlike 
                                                          
2 Note that ( )it iAR R  captures mobility in terms of the deviation between a farm’s rank in the 
period t and T-period income distributions, with ( ) 0it iAti R R   by definition. 
TM , kTM  can be either positive or negative. In particular, kTM  is likely negative for a time-
invariant revenue component that is positively associated with income (i.e. similar to CAP 
direct payments) given that the cdf  t tR F y  of the typically unimodal farm income 
distribution will be convex below the mode and concave above it. It follows from Jensen’s 
inequality that the average of the annual income ranks itR  of farms with low (high) average 
incomes will typically be above (below) their T-year income rank iAR , which in combination 
with the positive association between revenue and income will result in a negative value of 
( )( )kit kA it iAi t x x R R   and hence of kTM  (see Allanson et al. (2010) for further 
discussion). The weights kT  equal the shares of the total covariation between year-specific 
incomes and ranks that are due to each component. These sum to one, since t ktky x , and 
will typically be positive for revenues and negative for costs. 
 To investigate how changes in particular components affect mobility, we follow the 
approach in Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and consider a change in each farm’s income due to 
a change in component k from kitx  to kitex  in all years, where e is close to 1. The effect on 
mobility will approximately equal: 
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where the derivation relies on the assumption that income ranks, and hence component-related 
mobility indices, will not be significantly affected by the change (see Yitzhaki and Schechtman, 
2013). Hence whether a marginal, equiproportional change in the k’th component increases or 
reduces mobility, and hence short-term relative to longer-term inequality, will depend on the 
signs of both  kT TM M  and kTv .   0kT T kTk M M v   since multiplying all components 
by e leaves mobility unchanged.  
 1 ( ) ( )T A t ttM I y w I y    is defined for any relative inequality measure ( )I y . However, 
many such measures are undefined for negative incomes (Amiel et al., 1996) so the only other 
well-known ones likely to be of practical use are the Generalized Entropy index 
2( ) 0.5*var( / )E y y y  and the ordinally equivalent coefficient of variation. For 2( )E y  it is 
straightforward to show        ( ) cov ,/kT kit kt it t iA A kt t ti t tM x x y y y y N x y y      and 
     cov , cov ,/kT kt t t t t tt tv x y y y y y  . Moreover T kT T kTM e M M v     if relative 
incomes (in relation to the mean) are not significantly affected by the change in the k’th 
component. 
3. Empirical application 
The empirical analysis is based on individual farm records from the Scottish Farm Accounts 
Survey (FAS) covering the production years 1995 to 2009.3 FAS is an annual stratified sample 
survey of around 500 full-time farms chosen to be representative of their type and economic 
size as enumerated in the June Agricultural Census (Scottish Government, 2012). Table 1 
presents selected results obtained using 3 separate balanced panels constructed for consecutive 
5 year sub-periods. Direct payments were fully implemented by 1995 under the MacSharry 
reforms and decoupled in 2005 with Single Farm Payment entitlements determined using the 
historical approach. For each multi-year panel, probability weights were calculated using 
Census farm numbers in the base year, thereby abstracting from the effects of structural change. 
All standard errors were generated using a bootstrap procedure that reflects the panel design.4 
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Farm income was defined as the difference between trading revenues and expenditures, 
with this measure of cash income representing the return to the group with an entrepreneurial 
interest in the farm for their manual and managerial labour and on their investment in the 
business (Scottish Government, 2012). Average annual income over the entire period was 
£34,260 in nominal terms, with revenues of £117084 – £25960 in direct payments and £91124 
in other ‘market-based’ revenues (including associated grants and subsidies) – and 
expenditures of –£82824.   
Income mobility was 0.03 in the 1995-96 measurement period, meaning that averaging 
incomes over 1995 and 1996 reduced inequality by 3% compared to the weighted average of 
the Gini coefficients for the 2 years. TM  (the Shorrocks index of the degree of equalisation) 
was higher, as expected, in the longer measurement period 1995-99.  Allanson et al (2017) find 
that TM approaches an upper limiting value after about 10 years, with no further equalisation 
once relative incomes have approached their long-term values.  
The reported values of the component-related mobility indices reveal that income 
mobility was negatively related to both direct payments and trading expenditure but was not 
significantly associated with market-based revenues except in the 2006-10 measurement 
period. As expected, the covariation shares are positive for the two revenue components and 
negative for expenditure. In combination, these results might be taken to imply that the ‘share’ 
of income mobility due to the association with expenditures was slightly greater than one, being 
partially offset by the stabilising effect of direct payments and with market-based revenues not 
playing a consistently significant role.  
A more meaningful exercise for policy purposes is to examine the marginal effects. In 
the 1995-96 measurement period, an equiproportionate expansion in market-based revenue, 
direct payments or trading expenditure by an average absolute amount of £1000 per annum 
would have changed mobility by respectively –0.0008, –0.0006 and 0.0012 ceteris paribus. 
Hence, higher overall levels of support would have reduced mobility compared to what it would 
otherwise have been, unless offset by cost increases within agriculture. But a revenue-neutral 
change in the balance of support measures would have had very little effect on income mobility, 
with this also being the case both over the 5 year measurement period and for alternative base 
years. The corresponding elasticities of mobility with respect to the three components were –
2.4%, –0.4% and 2.8%, with little change in relative magnitudes over alternative measurement 
periods. The sensitivity of mobility to changes in market-based revenues and expenditure 
reflects the residual nature of farm income. 
Construction of balanced panels longer than 5 years results in a progressive loss of 
coverage by farm type and size due to sample attrition. Bearing this limitation in mind, longer 
measurement periods − up to the full 15 years of the study period − yielded broadly similar 
estimates of the marginal effects. For the 2( )E y  inequality measure, absolute marginal effect 
estimates were also found to imply that mobility was decreasing in the overall level of support 
and invariant to changes in its balance.5 
4. Discussion 
Direct payments are generally held to have increased farm income stability (Tangermann, 
2011), mainly because they are less variable than other income components (Severini et al., 
2016). However it need not follow that direct payments will have also reduced income 
mobility, which measures the movement of farms within the income distribution and therefore 
reflects the degree of idiosyncratic rather than overall income variability. This note makes 
novel use of a decomposition of the Shorrocks index by income components to show that a 
revenue-neutral change in the balance between market-based support and direct payments 
would not have reduced the variability of relative incomes in Scottish agriculture. It also adds 
to the existing literature on the redistributive impact of agricultural support policy, which 
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focuses on the effects on annual income inequality (Keeney, 2000, Allanson, 2008; 
Deppermann et al., 2014). In particular, higher overall levels of support would likely have 
reduced income mobility and thereby the degree of inequality in the short-term compared to 
the longer term. Further studies are required to explore whether these findings are more 
generally characteristic of the dynamic redistributive properties of the CAP throughout the 
European Union. 
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Table 1.  Income mobility effects by income component for selected measurement periods  
Balanced panel  1995-99  2000-04  2005-09 
Number of farms  385  310  383 
Measurement period  1995 only 1995-96 1995-99  2000-04  2005-09 
Base year  1995 1995 1995  2000  2005 
T  1 2 5  5  5 
Annual averages (£ per farm)              
Income  39489 *** 41350 *** 32533 ***  31228 ***  39427 *** 
 1472  1390  1171   1287   1372  
Market-based revenues  85984 *** 87906 *** 79197 ***  82117 ***  109299 *** 
 3110  2930  2740   3848   3347  
Direct payments  21372 *** 22333 *** 21596 ***  25115 ***  33034 *** 
 639  620  590   654   739  
Trading expenditure  –67866 *** –68890 *** –68260 ***  –76004 ***  –102906 *** 
 2673  2737  2716   3838   2969  
              
Average annual Gini: ( , )t t tw G y R   0.4927 *** 0.4658 *** 0.4982 ***  0.5083 ***  0.5020 ***  0.0153  0.0133  0.0156   0.0241   0.0158  
T-Period Gini: ( , )A AG y R  
 0.4927 *** 0.4520 *** 0.4622 ***  0.4479 ***  0.4374 *** 
 0.0153 0.0136  0.0158   0.0250   0.0169  
Shorrocks Mobility Index: TM   0 0.0297 
*** 0.0724 ***  0.1188 ***  0.1287 *** 
 - 0.0041  0.0068   0.0147   0.0130  
Component-related income mobility: kTM      
         
Market based revenues   - –0.0093   –0.0040    –0.0456    –0.0588 ** 
  0.0057  0.0158   0.0324   0.0265  
Direct payments   - –0.0160 ** –0.0491 *  –0.1522 ***  –0.1633 *** 
  0.0077  0.0258   0.0382   0.0247  
Trading expenditure   - –0.0458 *** –0.0835 ***  –0.2421 ***  –0.2588 *** 
  0.0099  0.0285   0.0874   0.0595  
Share of total covariation: kT      
         
Market based revenues   - 1.8344 *** 1.8344 ***  1.6766 ***  1.7648 *** 
  0.0963  0.1281   0.1725   0.0871  
Direct payments   - 0.2851 *** 0.2968 ***  0.3497 ***  0.3610 *** 
  0.0253  0.0332  0.0320  0.0274  
Trading expenditure   - –1.1195 *** –1.1312 ***  –1.0263 ***  –1.1258 *** 
  0.1141  0.1550  0.1906  0.0928  
Share of income mobility: /kT kT TM M               
Market based revenues   - –0.5743   –0.1025    –0.6433    –0.8066 ** 
  0.3837  0.3997   0.4341   0.3340  
Direct payments   - –0.1542 ** –0.2013 *  –0.4480 ***  –0.4581 *** 
  0.0762  0.1189   0.0864   0.0655  
Trading expenditure   - 1.7285 *** 1.3038 ***  2.0913 ***  2.2647 *** 
  0.4199  0.4965  0.4876  0.3742  
Absolute marginal effect 103: /( )kT T kT kAM M x   
           
Market based revenues   - –0.0008 *** –0.0018 ***  –0.0034 ***  –0.0030 *** 
   0.0002  0.0005   0.0008   0.0005  
Direct payments   - –0.0006 *** –0.0017 ***  –0.0038 ***  –0.0032 *** 
   0.0001  0.0005   0.0007   0.0004  
Trading expenditure   - 0.0012 *** 0.0026 ***  0.0049 ***  0.0042 *** 
   0.0002  0.0007   0.0010   0.0006  
Relative marginal effect:  /( )kT T kT TM M M                
Market based revenues   - –2.4087 *** –1.9369 ***  –2.3199 ***  –2.5714 *** 
   0.4346  0.4818   0.5154   0.3507  
Direct payments   - –0.4393 *** –0.4982 ***  –0.7978 ***  –0.8192 *** 
   0.0860  0.1441   0.1014   0.0825  
Trading expenditure   - 2.8480 *** 2.4350 ***  3.1176 ***  3.3905 *** 
   0.4793  0.6039   0.5728   0.3975  
Source: Authors’ calculations.  Bootstrapped standard errors in italics based on 1000 replications.  
Statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels are denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
